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Abstract
Several theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain individuals’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for public environmental goods. While most studies 
only take into account a single theory, this article discusses competing 
theories. These include, in addition to a basic economic model, the theory 
of public goods, Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior, and Schwartz’s norm-
activation model. Empirical results are based on a contingent valuation study 
of biodiversity in German forests. Multivariate analyses demonstrate that 
studies using single theories omit crucial explanatory variables and, hence, 
might be misleading. Economic models of WTP have proven to be incomplete, 
that is, they have restricted explanatory power and need to be supplemented 
by psychological and sociological models. Furthermore, a general finding is 
that factors influencing WTP are different for “in-principle WTP” on the one 
hand and “amount of WTP (given in-principle WTP)” on the other. Income, 
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for example, does not affect whether individuals are willing to pay at all, but 
significantly influences how much they are willing to pay.
Keywords
willingness to pay, contingent valuation, theory of public goods, theory of 
planned behavior, norm-activation model
Introduction
If values of public environmental goods such as clean air, unpolluted water, or 
biodiversity cannot be derived from observation of individual behavior in the 
context of markets (revealed preferences), they are commonly determined by 
responses to questions in surveys (stated preferences). Contingent valuation 
(CV) is still the most prominent technique of the stated preference methods in 
nonmarket valuation (Carson & Hanemann, 2005 for an overview). Roughly 
speaking, in a CV survey, respondents are directly asked for their monetary 
values of (changes of) environmental goods, predominantly by asking them for 
the maximum amount they would be willing to pay (WTP).
Using CV to value public environmental goods is an important and con-
troversial field of research.1 It is important because CV provides information 
about “the (monetary) value of nature” and this can help political decision 
makers. Nevertheless, issues intensively discussed in the literature refer to 
the question of how CV surveys should be designed and administered, how 
CV data are best analyzed, whether CV results correspond to economic 
theory, and whether WTP responses in surveys capture more than purely 
hypothetical values (Carson & Hanemann, 2005).
The present article is related to this discussion insofar as it asks what deter-
mines individuals’ WTP for public environmental goods. There are several 
studies aiming at an explanation of WTP responses in CV studies. These stud-
ies consider, besides economic variables, aspects of collective action (e.g., 
Blamey, 1998a), the effect of environmental concern (e.g., Kotchen & Reiling, 
2000), Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (e.g., Pouta & Rekola, 2001), altru-
istic motives or warm glow motivation (e.g., Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992), and 
Schwartz’s norm-activation model (e.g., Guagnano, 2001).
One drawback of studies of these types is that they normally focus on a 
single theory and, hence, their results may be misleading (see Wall, Devine-
Wright, & Mill, 2007, who recently argued in favor of comparing and 
combining theories to explain proenvironmental intentions). The interpreta-
tion of study results depends on which explanatory determinants, models or 
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theories have been considered. For example, a confirmation of the theory of 
planned behavior in CV studies is often interpreted in favor of economic 
valuation (i.e., in favor of construct or predictive validity, Meyerhoff, 2006), 
whereas a confirmation of the norm-activation model would doubt CV sur-
veys (e.g., Blamey, 1998a). But which of these models is more successful in 
predicting WTP responses when examined in a direct and comparable 
manner? The present article addresses this question by discussing competing 
theories and by testing them empirically in a CV study concerning biodiver-
sity in German forests.
Competing Theories
Basic Economic Model
Economic models focus on two determinants of WTP, income and the use of 
the good in question. When individuals consider paying for improved envi-
ronmental quality, their choices and responses to valuation questions are 
constrained by their (disposable) income. Accordingly, income should cor-
relate to the amount of money respondents are willing to spend in order to 
obtain environmental goods, to have better environmental quality or to avert 
environmental deterioration. Therefore, income is regularly included in 
stated preference surveys and is expected to have a positive effect on WTP 
(Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001).
Whether people actually use the public good in question is another determi-
nant closely related to the economic concept of value. If, for instance, a 
landscape is visited by an individual, it is expected to have instrumental value. 
People use the good because it is increasing their well-being. In this case, there 
is a direct behavioral link between the good and the individual’s well-being. 
This link is expressed by the concept of “use values.” If an individual does not 
use the good in question, the only link between the good and the individual’s 
well-being is the “knowledge” the individual has about the good. This link 
is expressed in “non-use values” (e.g., existence value). As this latter link is 
expected to be weaker than a link based on direct use, it is assumed that users 
are willing to pay more than nonusers (Carson et al., 2001).
Theory of Public Goods
Individuals might perceive and define their WTP as a contribution to the 
provision of a public good. This refers to theories of public goods and col-
lective action (e.g., Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992). One essential of a public 
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good is that no one can be excluded from using it once it is provided. Non-
excludability also holds for individuals who do not contribute to the 
provision of the good. Accordingly, this gives an incentive to rely on the 
contributions of others and to use the good as a free rider. Such situations are 
characterized as social dilemmas:
Social dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to 
collective irrationality. […] As individuals we are each better off when 
we make use of a public resource, such as public television, without 
making any contribution, but if everyone acted on this conclusion, 
the public resource would not be provided and we would all be hurt. 
(Kollock, 1998, p. 183)
Following mainstream economics, a rational actor would never contribute to 
the provision of a public good. However, this “zero contribution thesis” 
seems to be too pessimistic (Udéhn, 1993, p. 253; in addition to the strong 
version of the free rider hypothesis, there is also a weaker version: some will 
contribute, but the outcome is still suboptimal). Experimental evidence 
shows that people cooperate in public good games. They do not use every 
opportunity to free ride (see Camerer, 2003; Ledyard, 1995). People 
contribute to improving environmental quality although their contribution 
has only a minimal effect. This deviance from economic assumptions may 
be explained by theoretical approaches focusing, among other things, on 
fairness, inequity aversion, and reciprocity (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 
Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Tutic & Liebe, 2009) and 
on different types of actors including “conditional cooperators” (Ostrom, 
2000). Conditional cooperators make their behavior dependent on (their 
beliefs about) how others behave, that is, whether and how much others 
contribute.
In the framework of the theory of public goods, dilemma concern and trust 
in other people’s cooperation can be considered as determinants of WTP. 
Dilemma concern is seen as a concept to measure the degree to which people 
perceive environmental protection as a social dilemma and follow strategies of 
conditional cooperation (Franzen, 1995). It is expected that the more people 
perceive environmental protection as a social dilemma, the less likely they are 
willing to pay for the provision of a specific public good.
The concept “trust in other people’s cooperation” refers to a person’s 
belief that others are willing to pay or “do their share.” The assumption is that 
individuals who believe in other people’s “payments” regarding a specific 
public good are more likely to be willing to pay as compared to individuals 
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who do not believe in other people’s payments. This originates from the idea 
of conditional cooperation. Ostrom (2000, p. 142) stated that “conditional 
cooperators will tend to trust others.” Those who trust that others will cooper-
ate are less likely to think that they are the only ones who would contribute 
to the good. Several authors have discussed the relevance of collective action 
in economic valuation (Blamey, 1998a; Sugden, 1999), but no systematic 
empirical (quantitative) studies have been carried out to date.
Attitude-Behavior Paradigm and Theory of Planned Behavior
While economists rely on the concept of preferences in order to determine 
what people value, psychologists and sociologists have a strong affinity to 
the attitude concept. The main difference between the two concepts is that 
preferences pertain to choices between alternatives whereas attitudes focus 
on “the desirability of a single action or object” (Green & Tunstall, 1999, 
p. 222; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999). A “classical” attitude-behavior 
paradigm would assume that behavior can be predicted by attitudes. This 
would mean that general attitudes such as environmental concern have a 
direct and positive effect on WTP. Indeed, several CV studies have shown 
such effects (Cooper, Poe, & Bateman, 2004; Kotchen & Reiling, 2000).2
The basic attitude-behavior model is still part of thinking in social psy-
chology although there are approaches going beyond this simple paradigm. 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior which has been successfully 
applied to a variety of behavioral domains (see Armitage & Conner, 2001) is 
one of these approaches. According to Ajzen, the intention to perform a 
behavior is the immediate determinant of the behavior in question including 
“the behavior of paying money for a good” (Ajzen, Brown, & Rosenthal, 
1996, p. 45). Three determinants of the behavioral intention are proposed: 
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral con-
trol. The attitude toward the behavior refers to an individual’s positive or 
negative evaluation of performing the behavior. An individual’s perception 
of social pressure from reference group members to enact the behavior is 
captured by the subjective norm. Perceived behavioral control includes the 
perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior.
With regard to public environmental goods, WTP is expected to increase 
with a more favorable attitude toward paying for such goods, with increasing 
social pressure toward paying, and with an increasing perceived behavioral 
control regarding paying for such goods. The theory of planned behavior 
is confirmed in several CV studies (Ajzen et al., 1996; Meyerhoff, 2006; 
Moisseinen, 1999; Pouta & Rekola, 2001).
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Models of Altruistic/Moral Behavior
Theories of altruistic behavior are discussed in the valuation literature in the 
framework of a contribution model which is a counterpart to the purchase 
model typically assumed in CV (Guagnano, Dietz, & Stern, 1994; Kahneman 
& Knetsch, 1992; Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & Grant, 1993). Models of 
altruism are based on a broader motivational structure than standard eco-
nomic models. One possibility to “enable” altruistic behavior in economic 
terms is to use a utility function that incorporates a “taste for having other 
people better off” (e.g., Margolis, 1982, p. 21) where “others” does not nec-
essarily refer to human beings but also to environmental amenities (e.g., 
Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Altruistic motivation can lead to perceived 
obligations to contribute to the preservation of environmental goods. For 
example, people might feel that they are obliged to do something about 
deforestation of rain forests. It follows that a financial contribution to a spe-
cific environmental good may give personal satisfaction and thus yields 
individual utility when there are feelings of moral obligation. It is also known 
that some people like “to do good,” irrespective of specific environmental 
goods. People might perceive a general obligation to support good causes 
and benefit from contributions for “whatever reason.” In this respect, contri-
butions to environmental goods are just one way of obtaining satisfaction 
among many others.
In economic valuation, such general feelings of obligation are discussed 
in terms of “a warm glow of giving” or “purchase of moral satisfaction” (see 
e.g., Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992 and Andreoni, 1990 for a baseline model). 
People may derive utility from altruistic behavior per se, independent of the 
fact that others will be better off. This leads, for example, to “impure altru-
ism” in the model of Andreoni (1990) and is termed “participation altruism” 
in the model of Margolis (1982). Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) use these 
concepts to explain what is known as the embedding effect, that is, the obser-
vation that sometimes WTP does not vary with the quantity of the good in 
question. If people only derive utility from the act of giving, then it does not 
matter what quantity of the good is provided. However, Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992) pointed out that the moral satisfaction may vary with the 
good: some goods give more satisfaction than others. They also provide 
empirical evidence for the purchase of moral satisfaction (with respect to a 
good-specific moral obligation). Taken together, it can be expected that WTP 
is positively affected by both a subjective obligation to pay for the specific 
good and a general warm glow which is independent of the specific good in 
question.
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Norm-Activation Model
Schwartz’s norm-activation model (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 
1982) has been developed to explain (altruistically motivated) helping behav-
ior. It has also been applied in the context of environmental issues such as 
individuals’ WTP (Blamey, 1998a, 1998b; Guagnano, 2001; Guagnano et al., 
1994). The norm-activation model assumes that a personal norm leading to 
moral obligations regarding a specific action (such as paying for an environ-
mental good) is only activated and transformed into behavior if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. Schwartz’s theory is a cognitive and sequential deci-
sion model that covers the entire process from norm-activation to action. The 
model is quite complex and difficult to test empirically.
Although different specifications of the model can be found in the litera-
ture, also with regard to WTP for environmental goods (Blamey, 1998a, 
1998b; Guagnano, 2001; Guagnano et al., 1994), most specifications include 
the awareness of need and the awareness of responsibility as determinants of 
norm-activation. Awareness of need refers to the precondition that individu-
als must recognize that something has to be done concerning the object in 
question. Awareness of responsibility means that individuals must recognize 
that they are responsible for doing something. Given awareness of need and 
awareness of responsibility, a perceived moral obligation can result in spe-
cific behavior. Both determinants mediate the effect of a perceived moral 
obligation on behavior.
In the context of WTP analyses, the personal norm to pay for the good, the 
awareness of need with respect to providing the good, and the awareness of 
responsibility for paying are considered as behavioral determinants. The per-
sonal norm equals more or less the subjective obligation to pay which was 
discussed in the preceding models of altruistic behavior. It is expected that the 
awareness of need and the awareness of responsibility positively affect WTP 
when considered as interaction terms with the subjective obligation to pay.
Table 1 gives a summary of the six theoretical models and the related 
determinants of WTP that have been discussed in this section. These determi-
nants will be the independent variables in the empirical analyses presented in 
the following sections. Note that with respect to the theory of planned behav-
ior and the norm-activation model, not all determinants proposed by the 
models are considered. This means that these models are not fully tested. 
Table 1 does not include the subjective obligation to pay (i.e., the personal 
norm) regarding the norm-activation model and the interaction effects based 
on the norm-activation model. The subjective obligation to pay is already 
considered under the headline “altruistic/moral behavior.”
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Empirical Data
The data result from a survey that was conducted in 2004 as part of the 
research project “Forest conversion.” The aim of this valuation study was to 
estimate the benefits people would derive from different levels of forest bio-
diversity in the “Lüneburger Heide” region in Lower Saxony, Germany.3
The Lüneburger Heide (LH) is located in the relatively humid north-western 
part of Germany. Due to historic land uses, large parts of the landscape are 
covered with heath and pine monocultures. Therefore, the government of 
Lower Saxony has created a long-term ecological forest development pro-
gram (LÖWE). According to this program, forest conversion takes place in 
different regions of Lower Saxony and will cause, among other things, 
changes in forest biodiversity. For example, a higher portion of broad-leaved 
forests will affect both the kinds of plant and animal species present as well 
as the number of species. In order to determine whether improvements of 
biodiversity would increase the welfare of people living in the study region, 
a CV study was initiated.
Starting with a broader list of attributes describing different aspects of forest 
biodiversity, four attributes were selected on the basis of focus groups carried 
out in the study region: habitats of protected and endangered plant and animal 
species, species diversity, forest stand structure, and landscape diversity.4 The 
first and the second attribute were differentiated at two levels (medium and 
high), the third and the fourth at three levels (low, medium, and high). Further-
more, each level of an attribute was portrayed by a specific symbol. The 
attribute levels were chosen in accordance with the LÖWE program.
Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Approaches
Theoretical Approach Determinants of Willingness to Pay
Basic economic model Income
  Use of public good (i.e., forests)
Theory of public goods Dilemma concern
  Trust in other people’s cooperation
Attitude-behavior paradigm Environmental concern
Theory of planned behavior Attitude toward paying
  Subjective norm
  Perceived behavioral control
Altruistic/moral behavior General warm glow
  Subjective obligation to pay
Norm-activation model Awareness of need for paying
  Awareness of responsibility for paying
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The general structure of the questionnaire was as follows: (a) Respondents 
were asked about their frequency of forest visits in the LH and their knowl-
edge about general conditions of forests in Lower Saxony. (b) Basic 
information was provided on a map showing the areas where ecological 
forest conversion would be possible, and on a card explaining potential 
impacts on forest biodiversity. The card also depicted the symbols designed 
to represent the attributes. Then, respondents were introduced to the logic of 
the hypothetical market. They were informed that conversion of the forests 
could not be fully financed by public money. Therefore, the idea of a special 
“forest conversion fund” was presented. Based on this, respondents were 
finally asked whether they were in-principle willing to contribute to this 
fund. Those answering this question positively were offered a specific forest 
conversion program (Program A = LÖWE) together with a payment ladder to 
measure WTP (see Figure 1). (c) In addition to this valuation scenario, the 
questionnaire also included questions with regard to the theoretical 
approaches discussed in the previous section.
In autumn 2004, a professional survey organization collected data pertain-
ing to a random sample of 305 people aged 18 and over living in the study 
region (face-to-face interviews). The average interview time was about 30 
minutes. The data were weighted for descriptive analyses because due to the 
sampling procedure they were only representative of households and not of 
people. People living in a one-person household had a higher probability of 
being selected than those living in households with more than one person. For 
Without forest
conversion Program A
Amount
per year
WTP
yes 
unsure/no ×
Broad-leaved
trees
30 
percent
60 
percent
€0.50 _____________
€1.00 _____________
€2.00 _____________
€3.00 _____________
€5.00 _____________
€7.00 _____________
€10.00 _____________
€15.00 _____________
€20.00 _____________
€25.00 _____________
€30.00 _____________
€35.00 _____________
€50.00 _____________
€60.00 _____________
€75.00 _____________
€90.00 _____________
€100.00 _____________
€130.00 _____________
other amount _____________
Habitats for 
endangered/
protected species
medium high
Species diversity medium medium
Forest stand
structure low high
Landscape
diversity low medium
Figure 1. Description of environmental good and payment ladder
Note: €1.00 is about US$1.30.
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multivariate analyses, presented in the next section, the nonweighted data were 
used since it is controversial whether weighting in multiple regression models 
will give more valid results (Winship & Radbill, 1994).
Variables and Descriptive Results
Dependent Variables and Descriptive Results
“In-principle WTP” and “amount of WTP (given that the respondent is will-
ing to pay)” will be the dependent variables of the multivariate analyses 
presented in the next section. As mentioned above, respondents were first 
asked whether they were willing to pay at all in order to increase forest bio-
diversity in their region. If they responded positively, they were confronted 
with biodiversity attributes according to the LÖWE program, together with a 
payment ladder (Figure 1). In principle, 28% of respondents were willing to 
pay. For calculating the amount of WTP, the midpoints of the payment ladder 
intervals were used. The mean amount of WTP over all respondents was 
€6.86 (US$8.92) per person and year [with a minimum of €0, a maximum of 
€115 (US$149.50), and a standard deviation of 17.75], and in the subgroup of 
payers €24.29 (US$31.58) [with a minimum of €0.75 (US$0.98), a maximum 
of €115 (US$149.50), and a standard deviation of 26.41].
Independent Variables and Descriptive Results
The construction of the independent variables followed the theoretical dis-
cussion. Exact measurement instruments (question wordings) are given in 
the appendix.
Basic economic model. The monthly household net income was surveyed 
in two steps. First, an open question was asked and if the respondent refused 
to answer, she or he was requested to choose between stipulated income 
categories. Missing open values were replaced by the means of these cate-
gories. The remaining missing values were imputed by applying an income 
regression. For subsequent analyses, the equivalized disposable income was 
used. This was calculated by dividing the household net income by the 
square root of the number of all household members. The mean value of 
income was €1,347 ($1,751). Use of the forests was measured by asking 
how often respondents had visited the local forests in the last 12 months 
prior to the interview. On average, respondents had visited the forests three 
to five times. A binary variable was coded (1 = person had visited the 
forests), which gave 71% forest users.
116  Environment and Behavior 43(1)
Theory of public goods. Dilemma concern was measured using four state-
ments following Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1991). They were answered on 
a 5-digit scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) and focused 
on dilemma aspects of environmental protection such as the effect of individ-
ual behavior on environmental protection, conditional cooperation, and free 
riding. An additive index was constructed and its range was standardized from 
0 to 10. Higher values indicated a higher dilemma concern. The mean of the 
index was 3.6. Trust in other people’s cooperation was obtained using the fol-
lowing statement answered on a 7-point scale: “What do you believe: Are other 
people willing to pay something for forest conversion?” A value of 1 indicated 
that respondents believed that other people were definitely not willing to pay, a 
value of 7 that other people were definitely willing to pay. The scale was 
recoded to 0-6. The mean value was 2.0. Thus, the majority did not believe in 
payments by other people (low trust in cooperation).
Environmental concern. The measurement of general environmental con-
cern was based on nine items from a scale proposed by Diekmann and 
Preisendörfer (2003). These items focused on cognitive aspects (insight into 
endangerment) and emotional aspects (feelings of fear, anger, etc.). Follow-
ing the results of a factor analysis, six of the nine items were selected to 
construct an index with a standardized range from 0 to 10 and a mean of 6.77.
Theory of planned behavior. The three main components of the theory were 
measured using statements answered on 7-point scales. The variable attitude 
toward paying consisted of an index based on two items and had a standard-
ized range from 0 to 6. The items measured to what extent respondents 
perceived a monetary contribution to forest conversion as pleasant and ben-
eficial. This applied to about one third of respondents. The index had a mean 
of 2.98. The question aiming at the subjective norm revealed to what extent 
friends and relatives were in favor of the respondent voluntarily contributing 
money to forest conversion. The responses to this question showed negative 
sanctioning for 18%, indifference for 49%, and positive sanctioning for 33%. 
Using a scale from 0 to 6, the mean value was 3.18. The perceived behavioral 
control was also an index based on two items measuring to what extent 
respondents perceived a monetary contribution as easy and feasible. A contri-
bution would have been easy for 30% and feasible for 38%. On a standardized 
range from 0 to 6, the index had a mean of 2.71.
Altruistic/moral behavior. The variable general warm glow was an additive 
index consisting of three statements answered on a 5-point scale. The answers 
to the statements indicated to what extent respondents liked to support envi-
ronmental projects, whether donations were associated with a good feeling, 
and whether there was a perceived obligation to help other people and to 
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support environmental projects. The index had a standardized range from 0 
to 10 and a mean of 4.48. The subjective obligation to pay was measured with 
a single statement on a 7-point scale: “To what extent do you perceive paying 
something for forest conversion as a moral obligation?” The scale was coded 
0 to 6. A rather strong moral obligation (values 4, 5, or 6) was perceived by 
27%. The scale had a mean of 2.17.
Norm-activation model. In addition to subjective obligation to pay, the other 
main variables of the model are awareness of need and awareness of responsi-
bility for paying. The variable awareness of need for paying was obtained using 
two statements that aimed to determine the perceived importance of forest con-
version. The statements were answered on 5-point scales, an index was 
constructed with a standardized range from 0 to 4, the mean of this index was 
2.04. A single statement, again answered on a 5-point scale, was used to mea-
sure awareness of responsibility for paying. This statement referred to a “defense 
strategy,” that is, to what extent respondents were convinced that they already 
paid enough for other things and, therefore, did not have to pay for forest con-
version. Recoding the variable so that higher values indicated a higher awareness 
of responsibility, 21% of the respondents perceived a responsibility (values 3 or 
4). On a value range of 0 to 4, the variable had a mean of 1.37.
Control variables. The multivariate analyses were controlled for the 
sociodemographic variables of gender, age in years and education in years. 
With regard to gender, 60% of the respondents were female. The average 
respondent was 48 years old and had 10 years of education.5
Multivariate Results
To test the hypotheses derived from the competing theories, two separate 
decisions were considered: first, whether a respondent was willing to pay at 
all, and second, how much she or he was willing to pay given a WTP “in 
principle.” Probit models were applied for the first decision, OLS regressions 
for the second one.6
In-Principle Willingness to Pay
The multivariate analyses regarding Pr(WTP >0) were conducted following the 
discussion of the explanatory approaches. The results are given in Table 2. The 
first six Models (A to F) consider each explanatory approach separately, whereas 
Model G includes all explanatory determinants. The full Model G excludes the 
proposed interaction effects and the variable “perceived behavioral control.” 
The latter was not included because income and behavioral control (as a proxy 
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for the budget restriction) were highly correlated, which resulted in problems of 
multicollinearity. Since income can be seen as the common measure for budget 
restrictions, it has been decided to omit the behavioral control variable. All 
models take into account gender, age, and education as control variables. With 
the exception of gender and use of forests, all independent variables were cen-
tered to a mean of zero.
Model A in Table 2 includes the basic economic determinants of WTP. In 
the present study, income does not have a significant effect on the probability 
of being willing to pay. Use of the forests, however, does affect this probabil-
ity. Forest users are more likely to be willing to pay compared to nonusers. 
The overall fit of the economic model is rather weak (Pseudo-R2 = .07).7
The variables of the theory of public goods in Model B have more explan-
atory power. The higher an individual’s dilemma concern, the less likely she 
or he is willing to pay. Conversely, a higher level of trust in other people’s 
cooperation increases the probability. Thus, respondents who perceive the 
effect of their contribution to environmental protection as minimal and who 
make their behavior dependent on the behavior of others are less likely to be 
willing to pay. This is in line with the trust effect. If respondents are con-
vinced that other people are also paying for forest conversion, then they do 
not believe that they are the only ones contributing (being a “sucker”). The 
two determinants of collective action have a considerably higher explanatory 
power (Pseudo-R2 = .23) than the economic determinants.
Model C indicates that environmental concern has a positive and significant 
influence on the probability of being willing to pay. This direct effect supports 
the simple attitude-behavior paradigm. Greater environmental concern 
increases the in-principle WTP. Compared to the basic economic model, the 
attitude-behavior paradigm has a slightly higher model fit (Pseudo-R2 = .09).
The fit of the model is much better with regard to the theory of planned 
behavior in Model D. All three determinants have the expected positive and 
significant effects. The likelihood of being willing to pay is greater with an 
increasing positive attitude toward forest conversion, with increasing posi-
tive sanctioning of friends and relatives, and with increasing perceived 
behavioral control. Model D has high explanatory power (Pseudo-R2 = .32).
The two variables with respect to altruistic/moral behavior in Model E 
also have high explanatory power (Pseudo-R2 = .33). A general warm glow, 
that is, the good feeling and perceived obligation to engage in environmental 
and social issues, and also the subjective obligation to pay for forest conver-
sion in particular increase the probability of being willing to pay.
The subjective obligation to pay in terms of a personal norm is also a main 
determinant of the norm-activation model. In fact, the activation of this norm 
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will be explained by the model. The test procedure in Model F shows a par-
tial confirmation of the norm-activation model. The awareness of need has 
no significant effect, whereas both the subjective obligation to pay and the 
awareness of responsibility have positive and significant main effects. Fur-
thermore, the higher the awareness of responsibility, the stronger the effect of 
the subjective obligation to pay. In a strict sense, the effect of the personal 
norm should be completely moderated by the other variables. However, it has 
to be kept in mind that not all determinants proposed by the norm-activation 
model were considered and that in general it is reasonable to assume an inde-
pendent effect of the personal norm. Most studies do not reveal such effects 
because they do not consider the personal norm as a covariate in their models 
(e.g., Guagnano, Dietz, & Stern, 1994). The norm-activation model has the 
highest explanatory power (Pseudo-R2 = .41).
Finally, Model G presents the results of a full model including all proposed 
determinants of the probability of being willing to pay. It also gives effects of a 
one-unit change of the independent variables on the probability to be willing to 
pay given a reference individual who is male, a forest user and has mean values 
for all other variables. The in-principle WTP of such a person would be 11%. 
Model G solves the puzzle of which determinants are most influential. It can be 
seen that three determinants significantly affect the likelihood of being willing 
to pay and eliminate significant effects of other variables. These three most 
important determinants are use of forests, subjective obligation to pay, and 
awareness of responsibility. According to the effects of a one-unit change of 
the independent variables on the probability of being willing to pay in Model 
G, forest users have a probability that is 14 percentage points higher than for 
nonusers. A one-unit increase in the subjective obligation to pay and in the 
awareness of responsibility increases the likelihood by 5 and 10 percentage 
points. Overall, aspects of the theory of public goods and attitude-related 
models lose explanatory power. The explanation of in-principle WTP is domi-
nated by the economic user aspect and by aspects of norm-related behavior.
Amount of Willingness to Pay
The following results pertain to the amount of WTP, given that an individual 
is willing to pay. The results shown in Table 3 are based on OLS regressions. 
Due to a right-skewed distribution, the natural logarithm of WTP amounts 
was used as dependent variable. Analogous to the previous section, first, 
models for each theory are given (Models A to F), and, second, a full model 
was estimated (Model G). However, interaction effects proposed in the norm-
activation model are not incorporated. The main reason for this is that the 
estimations are based on a relatively small number of cases (N = 81).
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It can be seen from Table 3 that only the three determinants income, envi-
ronmental concern, and awareness of responsibility significantly affect the 
amount of WTP. These determinants have positive effects which are stable 
across model variants, that is, also stable when controlling for all proposed 
determinants in Model G. They are part of the basic economic model, the 
attitude-behavior paradigm, and the norm-activation model. Thus, variables 
of the theory of public goods, the theory of planned behavior and altruistic/
moral behavior have no noteworthy influence.
Interestingly, a comparison between Tables 2 and 3 supports the assumption 
that in the present study the two decisions “in-principle WTP” and “amount of 
WTP” can and must be separated. Both decisions are determined by different 
variables. This is particularly obvious with respect to the effect of income 
which does not significantly affect in-principle WTP, but is a strong predictor 
of amount of WTP given WTP > 0. Since both income and WTP amount are 
logarithmized variables, the effect of income in Table 3 can be interpreted in 
terms of income elasticity. In Models A and G, a one-percentage increase in 
income gives an increase in WTP of .90 and .78 percentage points.
The missing effect of income with regard to in-principle WTP indicates 
that income does not affect the purchase decision (whether to purchase the 
good at all) but the decision how much to pay, given a purchase decision. 
Similar examples showing that variables may have different effects on each 
of the two decisions can be found for the purchase of other durable goods not 
related to the field of environmental protection (e.g., Cragg, 1971).
Concluding Remarks
Many studies that attempt to explain individuals’ WTP for public environmen-
tal goods take into account a single theory. The present results demonstrate that 
such studies may be misleading. For example, when considered independently, 
the findings support the theory of planned behavior in predicting whether indi-
viduals are willing to pay for ecological forest conversion. However, a full 
model including determinants from competing theories shows that the eco-
nomic variable use of the forests, the personal norm and awareness of 
responsibility derived from the norm-activation model have higher explanatory 
power than variables derived from the theory of planned behavior (as well as 
the theory of public goods and the simple attitude-behavior paradigm). This is 
especially remarkable because processes of norm activation are often inter-
preted as being in conflict with the foundations of economic valuation, whereas 
attitude-behavior models are interpreted as being in favor of it. Thus, only stud-
ies that include competing theories can contribute toward answering the 
question of what determines individuals’ WTP for environmental goods.
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Of course, it may not be possible to generalize on the basis of the findings 
of the present study. A generalization would need further empirical evidence. 
More comparative studies with regard to competing explanatory models 
should be conducted. Such studies should also investigate different environ-
mental goods. It has to be noted that some of the theoretical models were not 
fully tested and that some measurement instruments may not entirely fit the 
theoretical models. Nevertheless, the empirical results confirm the impor-
tance of incorporating different approaches.
The findings revealed two separated WTP decisions where the first deci-
sion pertains to whether an individual is willing to pay at all, and the second 
refers to the amount of WTP given that the individual is willing to pay in 
principle. In the present study, these decisions are affected by different 
behavioral determinants. For example, income does not significantly affect 
in-principle WTP but is a main predictor of WTP amount. Future studies 
should use different hypothetical market settings (for example, with different 
payment procedures and vehicles) to test the validity of this discrepancy 
between behavioral determinants regarding in-principle WTP on the one 
hand and amount of WTP on the other.
Moreover, additional studies concerning private environmental consumer 
goods (as opposed to public environmental goods) are needed. This is par-
ticularly important with respect to theoretical construct validity of economic 
valuation. If purchase and consumption of private environmental goods (such 
as recycling products or organic food products) is in line with theories of 
moral/altruistic behavior or with theories of norm-activation (as suggested by 
Guagnano 2001), then norm-orientation would not be a worrying finding for 
economic valuation, but a “common” determinant of consumer decisions. 
This in turn would motivate new directions in theory building.
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Notes
1. Public environmental goods belong to the general class of public goods which, 
opposed to private goods, can be characterized by nonexcludability and/or non-
rivalry in consumption. Such public goods have externality effects not priced 
through markets. They can be called nonmarket goods and services, because they 
are not traded in markets and do not have a market price. In fact, public environ-
mental goods often have features of both private and public goods. A unique land-
scape, for example, is connected with use values (e.g., benefits from recreational 
opportunities) and nonuse values (e.g., benefits derived from knowing that such a 
landscape exists). The present article focuses on stated preferences methods that 
can be applied to measure both use and nonuse values.
2. However, it is well known that there are only moderate correlations between envi-
ronmental attitudes and behavior (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986/1987). 
Several models have been developed that incorporate an indirect effect of attitudes 
on behavior as well as possible direct effects. Examples are the A-B-C model 
proposed by Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz (1995), and the low-cost hypothesis 
proposed by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003).
3. The project was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research. It included two regions, the Lüneburger Heide and Solling/Harz, both 
located in Lower Saxony. We focus only on the Lüneburger Heide, but the main 
results concerning determinants of WTP proved to be very similar.
4. Habitats for endangered and protected plant and animal species means the number 
of habitats that exist in order to protect endangered and protected plant and animal 
species. Species diversity considers mainly the number of plant and animal spe-
cies. Forest stand structure refers to the diversity of vegetation layers based on 
different-aged tree rejuvenation. Landscape diversity means the number of differ-
ent stand types and forest communities based on main tree species and the occur-
rence of pure and mixed stands.
5. For more details about the construction, justification, reliability, and validity of the 
various indices in this section, see Liebe (2007).
6. A two-part model of this type is only appropriate if the two decisions are rela-
tively independent of each other. Formulated in statistical terms, this means that 
the assumption of “complete dominance” must hold (e.g., Jones, 1989 for a short 
overview on relevant statistical models). Supplementary analyses presented in 
Liebe (2007) show that complete dominance can in fact be assumed for the data.
7. With regard to the control variables, only education shows an effect. More highly 
educated people are more likely to be willing to pay. The effect of income (in the 
Models A and G) is also not significant when education as a control variable is 
excluded.
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